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THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND 
APPEALS COURTS NOMINEES 
Carl Tobias· 
On May 9, President George W. Bush announced his first set of nominees for 
the United States Courts of Appeals. With a White House ceremony which chief 
executives traditionally reserve for United States Supreme Court designees, the 
president introduced eleven individuals whom he proposed for vacancies on the 
federal intermediate appellate courts. Submitting a package of appeals court 
nominees might seem to be a relatively mundane exercise. However, the 
developments that led to Bush's recommendations, the staging of this event, and the 
candidates tendered actually reveal much about contemporary judicial selection, 
which is a critical feature of constitutional governance. For example, the 
determination that there should be a ceremony suggests the crucial symbolic and 
practical importance the nascent Bush Administration assigns to filling empty 
appellate court seats. The persons whom the president earlier considered but did 
not nominate on May 9 are similarly instructive. 
These propositions mean that the initial batch of Bush Administration nominees 
for the appeals courts warrants analysis. This essay undertakes that effort. I first 
examine the background of the May 9th announcement. The essay then evaluates 
the process· that the chief executive and his assistants used to nominate the 
candidates, as well as the qualifications of the people chosen and those individuals 
whom the president considered, yet decided against proposing. I next posit 
numerous lessons that can be derived from assessing the method that the chief 
executive and his staff employed to select the initial nominees and the persons 
nominated. The essay concludes with several recommendations for the future 
appointment of judges. 
I. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SELECTION 
'The historical developments that preceded President Bush's May 9 
announcement of the eleven nominees may appear to deserve somewhat limited 
examination, partly because this background has received considerable treatment 
elsewhere.• However, rather comprehensive exploration is advisable, as that type 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University ofNevada, Las Vegas. 
I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for her valuable suggestions, Angeline Garbett for processing 
this piece, and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1 See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Choosing Judges at the Close of the Clinton Administration, 52 
RUTGERS L. REV. 827 (2000); Clinton's Judicial Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 224 (2001). See 
also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2000); SHELDON 
GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERALJUDGES LoWER COURT SELEcnON FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH 
REAGAN (1997). 
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of analysis should inform appreciation of Bush Administration actions and modem 
judicial appointments. This section emphasizes the controversial Senate rejection 
of Circuit Judge Robert Bork for the Supreme Court in 1987 and applicable events 
since this incident, because many phenomena which characterize recent judicial 
selection can be traced to that confirmation dispute. 
A. Selection in the Carter Administration 
A small number of women and very few minorities served on the federal 
appellate or district courts when President Jimmy Carter won election during 1976. 2 
He accorded the appointment of more female and minority judges a high priority 
and implemented several initiatives to realize this goal. For instance, the chief 
executive asked that senators search for, delineate, and recommend women and 
minorities and establish district court nominating panels which would identify and 
promote their candidacies, while he created the United States Circuit Judge 
Nominating Commission to identify and foster selection of female and minority 
appeals court judges. 3 Approximately one-sixth of the judges whom Carter named 
were women, and more than twenty percent were minorities.4 
B. Selection in the Reagan Administration 
When Ronald Reagan became president in 1980, he asserted that his election 
constituted a public mandate to move the judiciary in a politically conservative 
direction. s The chief executive appointed numerous judges with these ideological 
perspectives; however, he chose tiny numbers of female and minority attorneys. 
Indeed, fewer than two percent of the judges whom the president selected were 
African Americans.6 
2 See Robert J. Lipshutz & Douglas B. Huron, Achieving a More Representative Federal 
Judiciary, 62 JUDICATURE 483 ( 1979); Elliot.E. Slotnick, lowering the Bench or Raising It 
Higher?: Affirmative Action and Judicial Selection During the Carter Administration, 1 
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 270, 271 (1983). 
) See, e.g., LARRY c. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT 
JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES ( 1980); 
ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS: THEIR 
MEMBERS, PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES (1981); Federal Judicial Selection: The 
Problems and Achievements of Carter's Merit Plan, 62 JUDICATURE 463 (1979). 
4 See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and 
Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 322, 325 (1989); Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal 
Judicial Selection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1261. For more discussion of the Carter 
Administration, see GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 236-84. 
s See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE 60 (1988); Sheldon Goldman, 
Reagan's Judicial Appointments at Mid-term: Shaping the Bench in His Own Image, 66 
JUDICATURE 334, 347 (1983). 
6 See Goldman, supra note 4, at 322, 325; Tobias, supra note 4, at 1269. 
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Perhaps most important to the issues treated in this essay was Reagan's 1987 
choice of Judge Bork to replace retiring U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., because the controversial battle which ensued over Bork's confirmation 
substantially changed modem judicial selection, and the event's repercussions 
continue. 7 The sharply-contested nomination, and attempted confirmation, of Judge 
Bork help explain the increasingly partisan, contentious state of appointments. 8 
President Reagan's nomination of Judge Bork triggered a protracted, bitter 
confirmation fight, in part because many observers perceived the Supreme Court to 
be evenly divided along ideological lines.9 The chief executive and Judge Bork's 
supporters contended that his service as solicitor general, as a member of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and as a respected professor at Yale 
Law School made Bork eminently qualified for the Supreme Court. The nominee's 
opponents argued that his views on numerous important issues were outside the 
mainstream of American jurisprudential thought. A majority of the American Bar 
Association Standing Committee on the Judiciary rated Bork as qualified, but some 
of the entity's members found him unqualified. 10 A broad range of interest groups 
waged public relations campaigns for and against Bork's candidacy and intensively 
lobbied senators. After contentious Judiciary Committee hearings and rancorous 
floor debate, the Senate rejected Bork by a significant margin. 11 Most senators who 
voted against Bork, and some members of the public, believed that his perspectives 
were too extreme. In contrast, senators who voted for the nominee and others in the 
public found that Bork was an exceptional choice, that the Senate had rejected him 
on ideological grounds, and that opponents had misrepresented the judge's record. 
C. Selection in the Bush Administration 
After George Bush won the 1988 election, he promised to honor President 
Reagan's pledge by making the bench more conservative. 12 Bush chose numerous 
7 See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE (1989); STEPHEN CARTER, THE 
CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994). 
8 See GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 76-77; PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT: 
CLARENCE THOMAS, ROBERT BORK, AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT'S NO MINA TJON BA TTL.ES ( 1992). 
9 See, e.g., BRONNER, supra note 7; CARTER; supra note 7; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 
71-73, 76-77, 125-26, 196-97, 219-21, 239-40; MARKGITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE 
(1992). 
10 See BRONNER, supra note 7, at 205; CARTER, supra note 7, at 163-64; GERHARDT, 
supra note 1, at 73. See also infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
11 See BRONNER, supra note 7, at 327; CARTER, supra note 7, at 124-25; GERHARDT, 
supra note 1, at 183. For more discussion of the Reagan Administration, see GOLDMAN, 
supra note 1, at 285-345; O'BRIEN, supra note 5, at 60-64. 
12 See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial legacy: The Final Imprint, 16 
JUDICATURE 282 ( 1993) [hereinafter Goldman, Final]; Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint 
on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 14 JUDICATURE 294 (1991); Tobias, supra note 
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rather conservative members of the judiciary and comparatively few minorities, 
although he did appoint a significant number of women. 13 Quite relevant to this 
essay are many developments implicating judicial selection that seemingly derived 
from the Bork confirmation fight. For example, certain dynamics similar to those 
which attended the Bork controversy accompanied the divisive appointments 
process that ensued when President George Bush nominated D.C. Circuit Judge 
Clarence Thomas for the Supreme Court. 14 The nominee's advocates and 
opponents, particularly from interest groups, proffered certain arguments analogous 
to those presented during the dispute over Judge Bork. 15 Following tumultuous 
hearings, which included charges against the nominee by Professor Anita Hill, the 
Senate confirmed Thomas on a 52-48 vote. 16 
President Bush, as well as Republican and Democratic senators, apparently 
instituted efforts to increase cooperation in judicial selection after this controversial 
fight. 17 For instance, Justice David Souter's confirmation proceeded rather 
smoothly. 18 Nonetheless, when President Bush left the White House, there were 
approximately 100 federal court vacancies. 19 Democrats claimed that these 
openings resulted from the chief executive's failur~ to nominate at a steady pace 
individuals whom Democrats deemed acceptable.20 In contrast, Republicans 
attributed the numerous empty seats to Democrats' inexpeditious consideration of 
Bush Administration nominees.21 
D. Selection in the Clinton Administration 
When Bill Clinton captured the White House in 1992, some students of the 
federal judicial appointments process claimed that he emphasized competence and 
diversity and accorded political ideology less importance in appointing judges.22 
4, at 1270-74. 
13 See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 4, at 1270-74. 
14 See JANE MA YER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE 
THOMAS ( 1994); TIMOTHY PHEU'S & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES ( 1997). 
15 See CARTER, supra note 7, at 137; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 238-41. 
16 Goldman, Final, supra note 12, at 283. 
17 See id.; Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REv. 
309, 314 (1996). 
18 See CARTER, supra note 7, at 81-82, 162; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 73; Tobias, 
supra note 4, at 1273. 
19 v ACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY ( 1992). See also Sheldon Goldman & Elliot 
Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265 
(1999); Tobias, supra note 17, at 314. 
20 See Goldman, Final, supra note 12; Tobias, supra note 4, at 1273; Carl Tobias, More 
Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REV. 477 (1991). 
21 Id. 
22 See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 19; Tobias, supra. note 17. See also Joan 
Biskupic, Clinton Given Historic Opportunity to Transform Judiciary, WASH. POST, Nov. 
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The president chose very talented lawyers who increased the bench's gender, racial, 
and political balance while naming unprecedented numbers offemale and minority 
. judges.23 
During President Clinton's first year in office, judicial confirmation progressed 
somewhat slowly.24 However, in 1994 the chief executive worked closely with the 
Democratically-controlled Senate, and this effort led to the approval of more than 
100 judges.25 After the Republican Party recaptured the Senate in 1994, the 
processing of judicial nominees slowed considerably.26 Senator Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah), who became the Judiciary Committee Chair, promised to confirm nominees 
who were in good health, competent, and understood the role of judges.27 He 
pledged that the Committee would hold one hearing every month Congress was in 
session and would consider one appeals court, and five district court, nominees 
during each hearing.28 
Despite this promise, processing remained quite slow and the Senate approved 
fewer than twenty judges in 1997, the initial year of Clinton's second term.29 
Democrats claimed that the confirmation pace could be ascribed to delayed Senate 
Judiciary Committee consideration and inexpeditious scheduling of floor debates 
and votes.30 Republicans, for their part, asserted that Clinton submitted names 
erratically and that an insufficient number of lawyers tendered were acceptable to 
Republicans because, for example, the nominees might be "judicial activists."31 
Accordingly, during 1997 there were some 100 vacancies on the appeals and 
district courts.32 This situation prompted Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and 
19, 1996, at A19. 
23 See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 19, at 276-77, 281-88; Tobias, supra note 
1, at 839, 846. 
24 See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges 
to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254 (1997); Carl Tobias, Keeping the Covenant on the Federal 
Courts, 47 SMU L. REV. 1861 (1994). See also Tobias, supra note 1, at 829-47. 
25 See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78 
JUDICATURE 276 ( 1995); Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 Ho us. 
L. REV. 137 (1995). 
26 This was especially true in 1996, which was a presidential election year. See Goldman 
& Slotnick, supra note 24; Tobias, supra note 1, at 836-39; Tobias, supra note 25. 
27 See Goldman, supra note 25; Tobias, supra note 17, at 314-21; Neil A. Lewis, New 
ChiefofJudiciary Panel May Find an Early Test With Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1994, 
at A31. 
2s Id. 
29 See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 24, at 265-68; Carl Tobias, Fostering Balance 
on the Federal Courts, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 935 (1998). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 v ACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY ( 1997). See also Goldman & Slotnick, supra 
note 19, at 267; Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton 
Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741 (1997). 
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several national bar organizations to urge that the president and senators of both 
political parties institute measures which would expedite appointments.33 These 
remonstrations apparently had a tonic effect, because the Senate confirmed 60 
judges in 1998.34 However, the pace of selection subsequently slowed. During 
1999, President Clinton's impeachment significantly delayed processing.35 
Moreover, confirmation of judicial nominees proceeded quite slowly in 2000, as 
normally occurs during a presidential election year.36 Thus, when President Bush 
was inaugurated in January 2001, more than 100 vacancies, including nearly 30 on 
the appeals courts, existed.37 
II. CURRENT JUDICIAL SELECTION 
In the 2000 presidential election, Governor Bush secured a narrow electoral 
college victory and lost the popular vote. Moreover, the 2000 Congressional results 
left the Republican Party with a razor-thin Senate majority and, therefore, control 
of the Judiciary Committee that assumes major responsibility for the confirmation 
process. The Bush Administration assembled a judicial selection team which 
principally operated under the auspices of the White House Counsel's Office, in 
part because its members do not require Senate confirmation. 38 During March, 
Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, announced that the administration 
would not solicit ABA ratings of candidates' qualifications before their nomination, 
a responsibility discharged by the Bar Association for a half-century.39 Although 
33 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1997); 
Letter from N. Lee Cooper, ABA President, et al. to President William Jefferson Clinton & 
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (July 14, 1997), reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S8046 
(daily ed. July 24, 1997). See also Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 
1997, at 37. 
34 See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 19, at 266; Tobias, supra note 1, at 841-44; Carl 
Tobias, leaving a legacy on the Federal Courts, 53 U. MIAMIL.R.Ev. 315, 325-27 (1999). 
JS Tobias, supra note 1, at 844-47. See generally MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL 
IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2000); 
RICHARD POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE (1999). 
36 See Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84 
JUDICATURE 228(2001 ); Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection at the Clinton Administration's End, 
19 LAW & INEQ. 159 (2001). 
37 v ACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2000). See also Carl Tobias, Dear President 
Bush, 61 Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2002); Nick Anderson, Democrats Look to Battles 
After Ashcroft, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at A14. 
38 See Thomas Edsall, White House Prepares Judicial Nominating Blitz, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 25, 2001, at 29A; Neil A. Lewis, President Moves Quickly on Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 11, 2001, § 1, at 34. 
39 Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Martha W. Barnett, 
President, American Bar Association (Mar. 22, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov 
/news/releases/2001/03/20010322-5.html. See also AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE ABA 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS ( 1991 ); 
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the chief executive and his aides privateiy conducted much work, which culminated 
in the May 9 announcement of eleven appellate court nominees, it is possible to 
construct a·rather reliable descriptive account from newspaper and other sources, 
such as individuals who are familiar with the developments that transpired. 
The judicial selection team, which included Gonzales, Tim Flanigan, the 
Deputy White House Counsel, and other lawyers in this office, accorded the choice 
of federal judges, especially for the appeals courts, a high priority.40 The team, in 
conjunction with President Bush, articulated the administration's appointments 
goals and developed effective procedures for securing those objectives. The chief 
executive requested that possible nominees have great experience and intellect as 
well as "appreciate the separation of powers and understand and believe in judicial 
restraint."41 The office developed lists of candidates for each vacant seat primarily 
by contacting: senators and additional political leaders from the regions affected; 
organizations, such as the Federalist Society, with strong interests in judicial 
selection; and judges, attorneys and others who might be familiar with the 
professional qualifications or personal qualities of individuals under 
consideration.42 Once the team narrowed the lists of potential nominees, it invited 
those who remained to interview in Washington, D.C. Gonzales stated: "we ask 
them questions about their philosophy ... how do they construe statutes, how do 
they resolve disputes and what they believe is the appropriate role of judges," 
observing that President Bush agrees that the "role of judges should be fairly 
limited."43 
The team then selected finalists whom it recommended to the chief executive. 
If the president concurred and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
"background check" was positive, the individual received nomination. During the 
spring, various media accounts reported that the White House was considering the 
possible nomination of many persons to the appeals courts. 44 On May 9, the chief 
executive nominated numerous people mentioned; however, he did not choose 
Terry Carter, Squeeze Play: Bush Acts to Limit ABA Role in Screening Judicial 
Nominations, A.B.A. J., May, 2001, at 18. 
40 Edsall, supra note 38, at 29A. 
41 See David Savage, Bush Picks 11 for Federal Bench, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at 
Al; Deirdre Shesgreen, White House Begins Work on Filling Judgeships; Appointments 
Could Transcend Tax Cuts as Bush's legacy, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 4, 2001, at 
AS. 
42 See Arny Bach, Movin' on Up With the Federalist Society: How the Right Rears Its 
lawyers, THE NATION, Oct. l, 2001, at 11; Terry Carter, The In Crowd, 87 A.B.A. J. 46 
(Sept. 2001); Edsall, supra note 38, at 29A; Crystal Nix Hines, Young Liberal Law Group 
is Expanding, N.Y. TIMES, June l, 2001, at Al7; Lewis, supra note 38, at 34. 
43 Lewis, supra note 32. See also Thomas Edsall, Democrats Push Bush for Input on 
Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2001, at A4; Arny Goldstein, Bush Will Nominate 11 U.S. 
Judges, WASH. POST, May 9, 2001, at Al; supra note41 and accompanying text; infra note 
62 and accompanying text. 
44 See generally supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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several candidates whom the press reports discussed.45 
President Bush nominated to the D.C. Circuit John Roberts, a former deputy 
solicitor general and law clerk to Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Miguel Estrada, a 
former assistant to the solicitor general and clerk to Justice Anthony Kennedy, and 
the first Latino proposed for that court.46 The chief executive recommended the 
elevation to the Second Circuit of Barrington Parker, Jr., an African American 
whom Clinton named to the Southern District of New York.47 The president chose 
for the Fourth Circuit: Roger Gregory, an African American whom Clinton had 
given a recess appointment; Terrence Boyle, chief judge of the Eastern District of 
North Carolina and a former staffer for Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.); and Dennis 
Shedd, a judge on the District of South Carolina and a one-time aide to Senator 
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.).48 The chief executive nominated to the Fifth Circuit 
Edith Brown Clement, who is presently a judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana, 
and Priscilla Owen, who is now a Texas Supreme Court justice.49 For the Sixth 
Circuit the chief executive selected Jeffrey Sutton, who enjoys a national reputation 
for litigating on behalf of states' rights, and Deborah Cook, an Ohio Supreme Court 
justice.50 President Bush nominated to the Tenth Circuit Michael McConnell, a 
former clerk to Justice William Brennan and a law professor at the University of 
Utah.51 In short, the nominees included five current federal judges and two state 
Supreme Court justices; two African Americans, one Latino and three women; and 
four experienced Supreme Court advocates. 
Several candidates who had received considerable press coverage as potential 
nominees were conspicuously absent from the list of eleven.52 They included two 
possibilities for the Ninth Circuit: Representative Christopher Cox (R-Cal.), an 
influential member of Congress; and Carolyn Kuhl, a state court judge in Los 
Angeles and former Justice Department lawyer in the Reagan Administration. 53 
Another was Peter Keisler, a former law clerk to Justice Kennedy and Judge Bork, 
who was mentioned for possible nomination to the Fourth Circuit.54 
4S Id. 
46 See Savage, supra note 41; No Rush to Judges; George W. Bush 's Nominations for 
Circuit Court of Appeals Judges, THE NATION, June 4, 2001, at 4 (hereinafter No Rush to 
Judges). 
47 Goldstein, supra note 43, at Al. 
48 No Rush to Judges, supra note 46, at 4. 
49 Id. 
so Id. 
51 Id.; Savage, supra note 41. 
52 Savage, supra note 41. 
53 See Neil A. Lewis, Bush to Nominate JI to Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2001, at 
A24; Savage, supra note 41. See also S.J. Cahn, Cox Passes on Judicial Seat, L.A. TIMES, 
May 26, 2001, at Al; Henry Weinstein, Rep. Cox and Jurist Carolyn Kuhl Called Likely 
Nominees, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2001, at Al. For further discussion of Carolyn Kuhl's 
nomination, see infra note 80. 
54 Id. See also David L. Greene & Thomas Healy, Bush Sends Judge List to Senate, 
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President Bush's remarks in announcing the eleven nominees suggest much 
about the administration's views of federal judicial selection. The chief executive 
first acknowledged the critical significance of the duty assigned to him.ss Bush 
observed that a president assumes few responsibilities greater than nominating 
federal judges and that the Constitution and the nation require this power's wise 
exercise. 56 Members of the bench serve for life in positions of substantial influence 
and respect, while they are entrusted with the law's authority and majesty.57 
The chief executive then extolled the qualifications possessed by his nominees. 
The president asserted that "all have sterling credentials and have met high 
standards oflegal training, temperament and judgment. "58 He further described the 
nominees: 
Four of them serve as United States district judges, all four confirmed 
by unanimous votes. Two others are sitting judges on State supreme 
courts. Four have served as law clerks in the Supreme Court of the 
United States. One has served here as an Associate Counsel to the 
President. One already holds the position for which I nominate him, by 
recess appointment of President Clinton.59 
He characterized the nominees as "individuals of experience and character . . . 
[who] come from diverse backgrounds and will bring a wide range of experience 
to the bench."60 Bush claimed to have tendered the person's names fully confident 
that they would "satisfy any test of ... merit" while asserting that those selected 
"command broad, bipartisan support."61 
Bush next capitalized on this opportunity to outline his nomination criteria, 
stating that the people chosen would be of the "highest caliber" and would "clearly 
understand ... that the judge's role is to interpret the law, not to legislate from the 
bench. "62 Bush contended that his nominees would "exercise not the will of men, 
but the judgment of law" and would appreciate the difference, thereby enabling 
them to defend constitutional rights, enforce statutes, and dispense justice.63 
The president concluded by elaborating on the process employed and reflecting 
BALT. SUN, May 10, 2001, at IA; Neil A. Lewis, Washington Talk: Road to Federal Bench 
Gets Bumpier in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at Al6. 
ss PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ANNOUNCING NOMINATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. (May 9, 2001) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S REMARKS]. 
s6 Id. 
s1 Id. 
5s Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. See also supra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text. 
63 PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, supra note 55. 
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on the future. He stated that the administration had continued a constitutional 
process, which implicates the federal government's three branches, partly because 
it "sought and received advice from Senators of both parties~ "64 The chief executive 
said that he forwarded the nominees in good faith, trusting the Senate also to 
operate in good faith. 65 The president admonished that the confirmation system had 
recently been diverted to other ends, resulting in battles which bore little 
relationship to the nominee's merits.66 Bush characterized this activity as harmful 
"for the Senate, for our courts [and] the country."67 He urged senators from each 
political party to reject the past bitterness and provide fair hearings and prompt 
votes for all nominees, returning "civility and dignity to the confirmation process. "68 
Bush reminded observers that there were more than 100 federal court vacancies and 
that these openings cause "backlogs, frustration and delay of justice."69 
ill. LESSONS 
Numerous lessons can be derived from evaluating the selection procedures 
which ultimately led to President George W. Bush's nomination of the eleven 
individuals for the federal appeals courts and from examining the qualifications of 
the people designated. The system that culminated in the submission of these 
nominees, the persons chosen, and individuals considered but not proposed 
concomitantly yield instructive insights on contemporary federal judicial selection. 
A. The Bush Administration 
The process implemented and applied, the people nominated, and those 
considered yet not forwarded inform understanding of the nascent Bush 
Administration and its perspectives on judicial appointments. Numerous 
phenomena suggest that the president and his staff who are responsible for 
identifying candidates generally possess rather sophisticated appreciation of the 
modem selection process. Perhaps most telling was the ability to assemble less than 
four months after inauguration eleven highly competent appeals court nominees, 
who are diverse in terms of race, gender and political views, and who, if confirmed, 
would cause ten of the twelve regional circuits to have a majority of active 
Republican appointees.70 Other factors manifest similarly sophisticated 
64 Id. 
6s Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
6s Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Insofar as judges reflect the views of appointing presidents, having a majority is critical 
to the en bane process, which essentially has responsibility for the law of the circuit. See 
Warren Richey, Federal Bench at a Tipping Point, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 9, 
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comprehension of appointments. These are: the expeditious installation of an 
experienced judicial selection team in the White House Counsel Office; the 
devotion of substantial resources to the endeavor; the enunciation of clear goals and 
the development of effective procedures to realize them; the establishment of 
priorities; and the apparent amenability to capitalizing on the successes and failures 
of past efforts through dependence on efficacious measures, such as consultation. 
They also include a willingness to compromise by submitting Clinton appointees 
and considering, but not nominating, several persons who provoked too much 
controversy, while tendering a few quite conservative people. 
lbe practices instituted and employed and the individuals chosen specifically 
reveal much about the Bush Administration. They indicate that the chief executive 
and those assistants who work on judicial selection understand the substantial 
symbolic, practical and political importance of the federal judiciary as a general 
matter, and the appeals courts in particular. For example, reliance on a White 
House ceremony historically used to announce Supreme Court nominees when 
introducing the eleven persons shows the great significance accorded by Bush and 
his aides to appellate court selection and their appreciation of the critical roles 
which the media and public opinion play.71 The process and the people chosen 
indicate that the chief executive and White House personnel consider the regional 
circuits essentially the courts oflast resort in their areas because the Supreme Court 
hears so few appeals. 72 This phenomenon is accentuated by the perception that 
appellate judges increasingly resolve highly controversial social policy issues, such 
as those involving abortion, affirmative action, public school prayer and 
federalism. 73 
The procedures deployed and the nominees themselves concomitantly suggest 
that the Bush Administration comprehends the political value of judicial selection. 
These appointments enable the president to leave a legacy by naming judges who 
will decide cases long after the chief executive has completed his service.74 The 
process also provides a relatively cost-free means of cultivating conservative 
2001, at 1; No Rush to Judges, supra note 46. See also Michael Solimine, Ideology and En 
Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29 (1989). 
71 See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text. See also CARTER, supra note 7, at 13-
20, 25-31, 37-53, 166-69, 192-95; GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 212-49. 
72 See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL 17 (1994); Arthur D. Hellman, 
The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403 ( 1997); Neil A. Lewis, 
Bush to Reveal First Judicial Choices Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at Al 7. 
73 See DONALD SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS (2000); Su5an B. Haire et al., The Voting Behavior of Clinton's Courts of Appeals 
Appointees, 84 JUDICATURE274 (2001); Richey, supra note 47. But see Savage, supra note 
70. 
74 See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 100-01; Tobias, supra note 34; Warren Richey, 
Bush Pleas for New Judges, But So Far It's Hardball, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 
11, 2001, at 2; Shes green, supra note 41. 
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constituencies. For example, the president can solidify his political base when he 
nominates people with those views; even if they are not confirmed, the chief 
executive can claim that he attempted to appoint them. 
B. Modern Selection 
The practices which the Bush Administration implemented and employed and 
the persons whom the chief executive chose also inform appreciation of 
contemporary federal judicial selection while affording peculiarly salient insights 
on the norms, rules and practices which accompany court appointments today.75 
The procedures used and the nominees announced reaffirm the strength of 
numerous longstanding traditions and confirm the existence and growth of several 
modem ones. 
One clear illustration of conventional understandings is the substantial power 
to influence the process exercised both by the chief executive as well as the Senate 
and individual senators, especially senators who represent the state in which judges 
would sit. 76 Presidential power finds expression in the confirmation presumption 
that attends nomination and the choice of several quite conservative attorneys 
among the eleven.77 These lawyers' inclusion concomitantly honors the tradition 
that the chief executive may propose individuals whose political views ostensibly 
resemble his, even as Bush evinced willingness to compromise on this issue by 
tendering a few moderate nominees. 78 The Fourth Circuit most strikingly evidences 
Senate power. The nominees, who are sitting district judges in North Carolina and 
South Carolina, had been aides of the senior Republican senators from those states, 
while Virginia's Republican senators publicly urged Bush to nominate Judge Roger 
Gregory. 79 In comparison, the president withheld Peter Keisler's name for that 
court, partly because the chief executive did not consult the Democratic senators 
from Maryland where the opening arose. 80 Judge Gregory shows how nominees can 
be agents for themselves. The jurist had already served on the Fourth Circuit for 
six months under a recess appointment from President Clinton. Moreover, 
75 GERHARDT, supra note 1; GOLDMAN, supra note 1. 
· 
76 See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note l, at 135-79. 
77 GERHARDT, supra note l, at 81-134; supra notes 46, 62 and accompanying text; supra 
notes 41-53. 
78 GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 81. 
79 See Jonathan Groner & Jonathan Ringel, Judicial Nominee Horsetrading Heats Up as 
Confirmation Process Gets Weighed, AM. LAW. MEDIA, Sept. 4, 2001; Brooke A. Masters, 
Battle Brewing Over 4th Circuit Nominees, WASH. POST, May 5, 2001, at A6; Savage, supra 
note 41. 
80 See supra note 54. A similar lack of consultation with California's Democratic senators 
seems to explain the decision not to nominate Christopher Cox or Carolyn Kuhl on May 9th. 
See supra note 53; see also David G. Savage, Bush to Name L.A. Judge to 9th Circuit, L.A. 
TIMES, June 22, 2001, at Al2. 
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Virginia's senators may have been reluctant to oppose the first African American 
appointee to the appellate court which includes the largest percentage of African 
American residents.81 Maryland's senators correspondingly emphasized that Peter 
Keisler was neither a member of the Maryland Bar nor practiced law there.82 
This process and the people nominated also confirm the rise and development 
of certain newer conventions and norms. For instance, the group of nominees 
evidence the federal judiciary's increasing "professionalization" in the sense that 
persons selected possess prior judicial experience.83 The package concomitantly 
evinces the practice of elevation to the appellate bench from the state courts and 
other federal judicial positions - primarily district, but also bankruptcy and 
magistrate, judgeships.84 The individuals nominated, and Bush's characterization 
of their credentials, similarly suggest that those who receive nomination to the 
appeals courts must satisfy a quite high standard of competence. These 
qualifications include previous judicial service, Supreme Court or appellate 
clerkships, and being a Supreme Court advocate. Moreover, the names submitted 
indicate that a contemporary president's nominees must be diverse in terms of race 
and gender and even political views, particularly when government is divided.85 
Furthermore, several factors attest to the important role of interest groups. These 
include the apparent influence exerted on the nomination process by the Federalist 
Society as well as affiliation with, or membership in, this organization of many on 
the White House selection team and of some nominees.86 
The chief executive's remarks in announcing the eleven persons 
correspondingly reveal modern constraints on the process. For example, his 
comments indicate that presidents must be perceived as conciliatory, bipartisan, 
moderate and willing to compromise. Bush's statements also show that recent chief 
executives have developed a standard litany which they seem obligated to recite. 
For instance, these presidents must champion a civil, dignified confirmation process 
as well as fair hearings and final votes on all nominees for the good of the Senate, 
the judiciary and the nation because partisan contentiousness erodes respect for 
81 See Masters, supra note 79; Alison Mitchell, Senators Confirm 3 Judges, Including 
Once-Stalled Black, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A16. 
82 See, e.g., Greene & Healy, supra note 54; Masters, supra note 79. 
83 See, e.g., Goldman et al., supra note 36, at 241; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 24, 
at 259. 
84 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. President Clinton elevated several 
Republican appointees, including Judge Sonia Sotomayor and Judge Ann Claire Williams. 
See Tobias, supra note 1, at 842, 846. 
85 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. See also Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial 
Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998). 
86 See supra note 4 2. Efforts to shape the debate by commenting on candidates before and 
after nomination also evince the groups' influence. See, e.g., Jonathan Groner, Left Builds 
Case Against Bush Judges, BROWARD DAILY Bus: REv., June 5, 2001, at 1; Richey, supra 
note 70; Savage, supra note 41. 
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participants and the process and because vacancies create backlogs and delay 
justice.87 
N. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
This analysis suggests that the procedures employed by President Bush and his 
aides in tendering the first eleven appeals court nominees and the candidates 
submitted display much Bush Administration appreciation for contemporary 
appellate selection. However, subsequent developments, especially the decision of 
Senator James Jeffords (R-Vt.) to become an independent which accorded the 
Democratic Party a Senate majority,88 have dramatically altered the dynamics of 
judicial appointments. If the president wants to facilitate the selection process, he 
should consider several possibilities. 
One important concept will be bipartisanship. The chief executive's inclusion 
of two Clinton appointees among the initial eleven nominees is illustrative.89 Other 
examples are agreements among leaders in specific states that Democrats may 
recommend some district court candidates90 and in Congress that the party might 
propose a percentage of nominees. 91 Closely related is the notion of compromise, 
which the first package of nominees exemplified. For instance, the decision to omit, 
or delay, nomination of candidates who might prove controversial, particularly by 
engendering opposition from home-state senators, was advisable in May and could 
prove even more important in the future.92 
Another practice that has traditionally expedited the judicial selection process 
is consultation. For example, the chief executive indicated that he had secured 
advice on individual candidates before their formal nomination from senators of 
both political parties.93 Bush should also seek similar future input from Senator 
Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.), the Senate Majority Leader; Senator Patrick Leahy (D-
87 Reversed White House and Senate party control has led each to adopt the other's 
former ideas; Republicans now urge prompt votes on, and Democrats urge full scrutiny of, 
all nominees. 
88 See, e.g., Groner, supra note 62; Jeffords' Switch Cramps Bush's Judiciary Plans, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 30, 2001, at 1. 
89 They were Judges Gregory and Parker. See supra notes 43, 56, 81 and accompanying 
text. 
90 See Tony Batt, With Feeling and Fealty, Reid Counsel Helps Guide Judges Through 
Senate, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 26, 2001, at lF; Carl Tobias, Judicial Choices: A 
Bipartisan Way, NAT'LL. J., Mar. 12, 2001, at A23. 
91 This idea might be informal or formal. For example, Congress could pass a judgeships 
bill, which would authorize the 60 new judicial positions that the Judicial Conference has 
recommended to Congress. See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the 
U.S., 1999 OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 21-23. See also Tobias, supra note I, at 853; Tobias, 
supra note 32, at 749, 753. 
92 See supra notes 53-54, 80 and accompanying text. 
93 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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Vt.) the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair; and individual senators, especially who 
represent those areas in which judges will be stationed. 
The president as well should continue and expand the practice of searching for, 
identifying, and nominating the most highly competent individuals he can find. The 
initial eleven nominees, who included five federal judges, two state Supreme Court 
justices, and four former High Court clerks, demonstrated the type of qualifications 
that candidates shc;mld possess. These characteristics, thus, encompass 
industriousness, intelligence, independence, and balanced judicial temperament. 
Certain propositions above suggest that the chief executive should reassess the 
significance he attaches to nominees' ideological views. For instance, neither the 
2000 presidential election results nor the Senate returns constituted a resounding 
mandate for making the bench very conserv~tive. Moreover, Democratic control 
of the Senate will complicate efforts to name jurists with these perspectives. Bush, 
therefore, might want to consider compromising somewhat on the political views 
of the candidates he tenders, an idea that the first group of nominees may evince. 
CONCLUSION 
On May 9, President Bush submitted his initial package of nominees for the 
federal appellate courts. Assessment of the practices applied and the eleven 
individuals chosen reveals much about the Bush Administration's perspectives on 
federal judicial selection and about contemporary appointments. If the chief 
executive and his assistants who are responsible for choosing nominees adopt the 
suggestions proffered, they should be able to facilitate the selection process. 
